Facts, figures and data on migration and integration

Dr. Ramona Rischke, Co-Head of the Migration Department explains in an interview with Web.de:

"In principle, no human being is illegal. There is an important fundamental right to asylum. When we talk about irregular migration, we often mean unauthorized border crossings. People seeking protection should actually be registered at the EU's external borders. However, this does not happen in some cases - for example for capacity reasons. These people then travel on to apply for asylum in other countries. All of this is often referred to as illegal migration, but it paints a false picture, as many of these people later receive recognized protection status and these unauthorized border crossings are not punishable in the context of asylum applications."

No. The desired control effects are not to be expected.

The relocation of asylum procedures to third countries has been the subject of political debate for years and will be examined for legal feasibility by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) in 2024. Despite the numerous practical hurdles identified in the BMI's final report, some parties continue to call for asylum procedures to be carried out outside the EU. The CDU cites this in its basic program from June 2024 and argues that such a regulation would reduce dangerous escape routes, make the asylum system fairer and remove the business basis for smugglers.

In reality, however, there is no reliable evidence that outsourcing asylum procedures would reduce the influx of refugees to the EU. Australia, where the number of arrivals is declining, is often cited here. However, this cannot be explained primarily by the procedures on the island states, but above all by the military sea blockade, which stops arriving boats on the high seas and forces them to turn back. Such a practice would not be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Dr. Ramona Rischke, Dr. Zeynep Yanaşmayan and Dr. Marcus Engler from the Migration Department state in their statement:

• In addition to the expansion of humanitarian visas and resettlement procedures to complement asylum procedures in the EU, there are no convincing proposals for outsourcing asylum procedures to third countries while respecting the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. There is also a lack of accountability mechanisms for proven human rights violations.
• The desired control effects of the current signaling and deterrence policy (in particular a reduction in refugee migration towards the EU as a result of third country procedures based on the so-called "Rwanda model" or "Albania model") will not materialize to the expected extent according to all scientific findings. However, this policy damages Germany's international reputation and attractiveness as a business location.

In order to improve reception systems and the situation of refugees, the DeZIM experts from the Migration department see opportunities for action in three areas of intervention that should be pursued equally:

• Strengthening regional protection systems in initial reception and transit contexts
• Expanding regular routes to Germany for people seeking protection and other migrants
• Increase investment in the reception and integration infrastructure in Germany.

No. Not necessarily.

The reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) came into force in June 2024.
Among other things, the CEAS reform provides for the status of people who have very little prospect of protection in the EU to be decided at the EU's external borders in future.

Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser (SPD) commented at a Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg (June 8, 2024): "Today we have taken historic decisions for a Common European Asylum System. And we have shown that we Europeans are acting together - after years of blockades and disputes." The Interior Minister also emphasized: "In these procedures, we are committed to high rule of law standards and consistent protection of human rights. We want everyone to receive a fair asylum procedure."

The CEAS means that the human rights situation remains precarious

The reform provides for mandatory border procedures that detain asylum seekers in camps at the EU's external borders. This effectively leads to detention and worsens human rights standards: experience on the Greek peninsulas, in particular Moria, shows that such procedures undermine human rights standards and cannot guarantee a fair asylum procedure. This is because such procedures at the external borders cannot guarantee asylum processes based on the rule of law.

Weak solidarity among EU states

States are free to decide whether to take in asylum seekers, make financial contributions or participate in other ways. This means that the main responsibility remains with the states at the external borders, where even more people gather due to the camps. The situation at the EU's external borders remains precarious and often does not meet the minimum legal standards for reception conditions and the right to asylum.

Deterrence instead of protection

The reform focuses on deterrence through the external impact of the CEAS. It is assumed that people will be deterred from entering the EU "irregularly". From a scientific perspective, there is no reason to believe that the proposed procedures will result in fewer people attempting to enter Europe. People flee from war, persecution and existential hardship - not because of political measures. Dealing with flight is an ongoing task and requires the establishment and expansion of long-term, flexible structures.

Problematic returns

The reform prioritizes returns to so-called "safe third countries", even if these do not always guarantee protection for refugees (see outsourcing of asylum procedures to third countries).

The Migration Department of the DeZIM Institute has published a detailed statement on the reform plans, which can be downloaded here: Statement GEAS.

No, there is no scientific evidence for this.

Migration, including flight, follows complex decision-making processes. Scientific studies on long-term trends in global refugee migration show that it is primarily changing conditions and conflict dynamics in the countries of origin that influence the extent of international refugee movements, rather than the organization of reception practices in the destination countries, such as the level of social benefits. At the same time, existing networks in particular influence the choice of destination countries and the possibility of flight. Dr. Noa K. Ha, Scientific Managing Director, describes this in her statement of 8.4.2024 in the Bundestag Committee on Labour and Social Affairs, referring to current research.

The decision-making processes of migration and flight are often described in public discourse using the push and pull factors model. This model states that people are "pushed away" from their country of origin by factors (push factors) or "attracted" by incentives in another country (pull factors). The concept of push and pull factors must be fundamentally criticized. It neglects the role of states, networks and institutions in the migration process and largely ignores non-economic factors. This means that the complex dynamics of the migration process are not adequately reflected.

Most recently, the introduction of the payment card has reignited the debate on the apparent link between migration and high social benefits. According to the scientific assessment of Dr. Noa K. Ha and Prof. Dr. Herbert Brücker, economist and migration researcher from the DeZIM research community, among others, this does not contribute to solving the practical problems in the care of refugees. Rather, there is a risk that the switch from cash benefits to benefits in kind will be associated with high costs - both for the administrations and for those affected. In addition, the payment card reduces the opportunities for participation and integration of those seeking protection and can lead to stigmatization and isolation.

Yes, the international refugee protection system could collapse. There are three reasons for this:

• Financial cuts:

The field of humanitarian aid and development cooperation is currently experiencing massive cuts. Humanitarian programs are being scaled back or cut altogether. One dramatic consequence of this, for example, is that the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is being forced to cut around a third of its total staff worldwide.

Furthermore, the USA announced at the beginning of 2025 that it would stop funding for international development aid. This was followed shortly afterwards by the announcement that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) would be dissolved. The USA was previously by far the most important donor of development aid worldwide.

• Dismantling legal escape routes:

According to the UNHCR 2025, around 2.5 million refugees will be in urgent need of resettlement in safe countrieswhere they can find lasting prospects for their lives. Even in recent years, there have only been legal admission routes for a fraction of them.

Political decisions in the USA, but also by the German government - ending admission programs and suspending family reunification - mean that there are virtually no safe and legal escape routes left.

• Disregard for the law:

The legal and normative foundations of the refugee protection system are increasingly being called into question, such as the Geneva Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights.

These attitudes are strongly motivated by domestic politics. Governments argue that legal norms must not restrict the sovereignty of states too much when it comes to managing migration. As a result, court rulings are ignored and EU law is often broken.

In Germany, the Berlin Administrative Court ruled that refoulement at German borders was unlawful at the beginning of June 2025: no one seeking protection in Germany should be turned away without following the Dublin procedure. The specific case involved three Somalis who were sent back to Poland from Frankfurt (Oder) on May 9, 2025.

• Engler, M.; Rischke, R.; Yanaşmayan, Z. (2024): Statement on asylum procedures in third countries. A scientific assessment from the Migration Department on the outsourcing of asylum review procedures. DeZIM Institute.
• Engler, Rischke, Yanaşmayan (2023): Statement by the Migration Department of the DeZIM Institute on the planned reform of the GEAS. DeZIM Institute.
• Engler, M. (2024): Outsourcing asylum procedures – opportunity or risk? Heinrich Böll Foundation.
• UNHCR (2025): Funding crunch increases risks of violence, danger and death for refugees. UNHCR Briefing Note.  
• UNHCR Germany (2025): Numbers down: UN Refugee Agency estimates resettlement needs at 2.5 million.
• “We are seeing a massive shift in the discourse on migration and asylum. It started with the GEAS reform.”   Dr. Jannes Jacobsen, Deputy Scientific Director and Head of the Data Methods Monitoring Cluster, on SWR Kultur's “Migration and Asylum – How tough will the election campaign be?”
• “Over the past ten years, Germany has become one of the most dynamic players in migration worldwide.” Prof. Dr. Naika Foroutan, DeZIM Director, analyzes migration as a resource on International Migrants Day in the BR podcast.

Yes, migration contributes to the stability of the labor market and social security systems.

From 2005 to 2023, the employment rate of 15 to 64-year-olds rose both for immigrants (+11.9 percentage points) and for people without a history of immigration (+13.2 percentage points). However, the increase is particularly significant among descendants (+22 percentage points) and people with a one-sided immigration history (+24.2 percentage points). In 2023, the overall employment rate of people with a history of immigration was 69.2%, according to the figures in the Integration Report 2024.

In 2022, employment growth among foreign employees more than compensated for the demographically induced decline in German employees, according to the German Council of Economic Experts.

The figures on statutory pension insurance from the Insured Persons' Report 2024 also speak for themselves: at the end of 2022, 8.1 million people with non-German citizenship were actively insured - this corresponds to 20.3% of all insured persons. In comparison: in 2004, this proportion was still 8.3%. People with Turkish citizenship are particularly well represented, while the number of insured persons from countries in the Middle East, Ukraine and Iran has also risen recently.

Another key factor is the age structure of employees without German citizenship: on average, they are younger than employees with German citizenship. In the long term, this reduces the burden on pension funds and helps to curb the rise in pension contributions.

The figures from the Integration Report 2024 and Insured Persons Report 2024 show by way of example that migration plays a decisive role in the economic stability and sustainability of the welfare state.

No, migration to Germany does not lead to a higher crime rate in the places of immigration.

This is shown by current evaluations of the police crime statistics by district for the years 2018 to 2023 by the ifo Institute.

The reason for the overrepresentation of the proportion of foreigners in the crime statistics are factors independent of origin, such as the fact that migrants are more likely to move to conurbations where the risk of crime is generally higher.

This is also confirmed by the Integration Report 2024, which points out that people without German citizenship are more likely to be young and male, live in large cities more often than average and are also more affected by social risk factors such as precarious living conditions and limited educational opportunities - factors that have been shown to increase the likelihood of committing crimes regardless of origin.

The figures also show that foreign nationals are more likely to be both victims and perpetrators of crime. While they made up 15.2% of the population in 2023, they accounted for 23.4% of victims of crime. The proportion of suspects without German citizenship was 30.5%. This illustrates that many migrants are affected by crime themselves, rather than appearing exclusively as perpetrators.

A general problem in the discussion about crime statistics is also their inappropriate interpretation. The number of registered crimes is often wrongly equated with the actual development of crime. However, police control mechanisms, a changed willingness to report crimes and other statistical distortions have a considerable influence on the figures, as a recently published crime policy statement makes clear.

Yes, climate change, such as rising sea levels, droughts, and extreme weather events, is forcing more and more people around the world to leave their homes.

More than 600 million people have already been displaced as a result of global warming. According to the study Quantifying the human cost of global warming, it is estimated that up to two to three billion people could be affected by 2100 if global warming reaches 2.7°C.

However, the existing international legal framework for people fleeing the consequences of climate change is inadequate: neither slowly progressing environmental changes such as desertification nor sudden disasters such as floods are sufficiently recognized as causes for flight.

As Samuel Hagos and Pau Palop García, Migration Department, point out, climate migration is often “naturalized” in political discourse. This largely obscures the responsibility of industrialized countries, which are responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, and neglects the experience of poorer regions that are particularly affected by climate change.

Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (2024): 14. Integrationsbericht „Teilhabe in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft – Ein wissenschaftsbasierter und indikatorengestützter Lagebericht zum Stand der Integration in Deutschland“.

• Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2024): Versichertenbericht 2024.

• Hagos, S.; Palop-García, P. (2024): Framing climate change-induced displacement: Attributing disasters to natural causes. Public Anthropologist.

• BMI - Humanitäre Aufnahmeprogramme von Bund und Ländern

Yes, especially when it comes to labor market integration.

Integration courses have a positive effect on the integration of refugees, especially on the employment rate of participants. This is shown by a study by Dr. Niklas Harder, Co-Head of the Integration Department at DeZIM. Participants in integration courses, which have been offered since 2005, achieve an employment rate that is 4.4 percentage points higher than non-participants 12 months after starting the course. It is also worth noting that the ad hoc introductory German courses offered from October to December 2015 had no measurable impact on the employment rate of refugees. The ad hoc courses only comprised a total of 320 lessons instead of 600, there were no standardized curricula and no certificates of completion. This shows that the design of the courses is crucial.

The fact that only 763 million euros will be available for integration courses in 2025 instead of an estimated 1.2 billion euros last year, as reported by Mediendienst Integration, is therefore not conducive to integration into the labor market. The new Integration Course Ordinance, which was passed by the cabinet in November 2024, also tightens some regulations, for example, course repetitions are severely restricted, travel costs are only reimbursed in exceptional cases and special courses for young people, parents and women are canceled.

At the same time, however, interest in integration courses remains high. The BAMF expects the number of new participants in 2025 to be similar to last year.

Yes, through sustainable and resilient infrastructures, so-called "resilient municipalities".

Whether in 2015/2016 as a result of the civil war in Syria or in 2022 with the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine-when many people seek protection in Germany at the same time, it depends on the municipalities, as they are responsible for many areas relevant to integration such as schools, daycare centers, housing, healthcare and social participation.

The DeZIM report "Opportunities instead of "crisis". Resilient municipalities in the context of migration, integration and participation" shows how resilient municipalities can respond to this "stress test" and enable needs-based and sustainable integration work. A resilient municipality promotes equal participation in public life for all people and can also achieve this when crisis events increase the pressure on local society and municipal administrations.

This is what the municipality needs:

Good structures for all: Resilient integration work requires not only specific services for new immigrants, but also a functioning social infrastructure for everyone. Bottlenecks in housing, childcare, education and healthcare are a burden for both new immigrants and existing residents.

Public perception: Migration and integration must be seen as an opportunity. Integration work should be seen as a shaping task in society, local politics and administration, for example:

• to counteract the shortage of skilled workers or to improve one's own administrative actions and make them more diversity-friendly.  
• strengthen the existing skills and potential of people with a history of migration with municipal services instead of focusing on (sometimes stereotyped) deficits.

Acting together: A common understanding of integration must be established across different administrative units and sustainable cooperation with civil society (especially migrant organizations) must be promoted in order to create resilient and activatable networks when needed. 

Yes, measures such as family reunification and stable social networks have been proven to help reduce delinquent behavior.

In the public debate, it is often suggested that people without German citizenship commit crimes disproportionately often. A look at the figures shows that criminal behavior is not dependent on origin, but is rather linked to social factors.

Social integration is therefore one of the most important preventative measures against crime. Measures such as family reunification and stable social networks have been proven to help reduce delinquent behavior. Restrictive laws that could make family reunification more difficult would have fatal consequences in that they increase loneliness and social instability and thus increase the risk of crime.

Good integration work is needs-based and sustainable - and it can be seen above all in a successful arrival infrastructure.

This refers in particular to authorities that regulate the legal status of arrival, such as immigration authorities, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees for asylum procedures, state reception centers for the distribution of refugees in municipalities - if they exist in the federal states - as well as the residents' registration offices for registering the residential address at the destination.

The research report "Opportunities instead of "crisis". Resilient municipalities in the context of migration, integration and participation" has identified best practice examples of successful arrival infrastructure based on eleven cities and municipalities.

3 Best practice examples:

1. Information center: Especially in the context of refugee migration from Ukraine, some municipalities (e.g. Rottenburg, Munich, Saarbrücken) set up information points or arrival offices: Arrivals are given the most important bureaucratic information, can register and apply for social benefits. According to the municipalities, this bundling made it easier for arrivals to access the authorities and made the administration's work more efficient.
2. Multilingual advice in the administration: In Ingelheim, a guide for the administration on "diversity-sensitive language" helps to break down language barriers. The guidelines promote multilingualism in information services and the expansion of language mediator pools.
3. Volunteer coordination: In Rottenburg and in all Berlin districts, volunteer agencies bundle volunteer work and offer information events for volunteers. In Saxony-Anhalt, up to two integration coordinators are funded per district and independent city.

Find out more:
Opportunities instead of "crisis"

A good arrival: How immigration can succeed in municipalities

"Municipalities can do integration"

The integration performance of Syrians can be considered remarkably good.

Naturalization figures show a clear direction: in 2023, a third of all new German citizens came from Syria - around 163,000 people have been naturalized since the beginning of the refugee movement. Their number has increased sevenfold compared to 2021. The average naturalization period was only 6.8 years - a figure that is usually only achieved with exceptional integration performance.

The majority of these people are now employed and no longer appear in the statistics as Syrians, but as Germans. Their integration into the labor market is also remarkable: according to the Institute for Employment Research, six years after their arrival, more than half of Syrian refugees are employed - for men it is even two thirds, mostly in qualified full-time positions with an average income of around 2,000 euros. In addition, around a third of adults complete vocational or higher education.

Return-to-work debates often ignore this progress. They neglect not only the individual integration efforts, but also the considerable investments Germany has made in language support and training. Given the uncertain conditions in Syria and the real prospects for the future in Germany, the desire to stay is understandable.

Yes, between June 2024 and mid-May 2025, over 12,000 visa applications were submitted and more than 10,000 Opportunity Cards were issued.

The steady increase shows that the Opportunity Card has been well received and confirms its potential and relevance.

Since June 2024, the Opportunity Card has enabled qualified professionals from abroad to obtain a short-term residence permit (for up to twelve months) to look for a job or have their professional qualifications recognized in Germany.  

The Opportunity Card is aimed at:

• in particular, people who have recently arrived from abroad.
• People who already live in Germany and have a residence permit for the purpose of employment or education.
• Foreigners who have German skilled worker status (university degree or comparable professional qualification).

The Opportunity Card does not apply to refugees.

It is based on a points system for controlling recruitment, which takes into account, among other things, professional qualifications or university degrees, language skills (German at level A1 or English at level B2), and the ability to cover living expenses (€1,091 per month and health insurance).  

The residence permit is initially granted for up to twelve months. Holders of the Opportunity Card can engage in part-time employment for an average of 20 hours per week.

Based on the Opportunity Card, it is then possible to apply for a different, longer-term residence permit in Germany.

Applications are submitted from various countries of origin: for example, 4,600 visas were processed for people from India. Applications are also submitted from war zones, which shows that the Opportunity Card offers a way to find protection outside the asylum system.

Despite easier access, the Opportunity Card for skilled workers still faces considerable challenges:

• high time pressure,
• lack of qualifications when looking for a job,
• difficulties in finding part-time work,
• lack of German language skills,
• excessive bureaucracy,
• high living costs,
• social isolation, and psychological stress such as loneliness or frustration when looking for a job.

More information on the Opportunity Card can be found in DeZIM Policy Brief #05 “One Year of the Opportunity Card.”

• Press release by Minister of State Reem Alabali-Radovan
• "Integration is an ongoing task for society as a whole and it's not about how the people who arrive here have to make up for their deficits, but what we want to promote." Dr. Nora Ratzmann, research associate in the Integration department, on flight and integration in an interview on Deutschlandfunk radio.

Engler, M.; Palop-García, P. (2025): Ein Jahr Chancenkarte: Erste Bilanz des deutschen Punktesystems für Fachkräfteeinwanderung. DeZIM Policy Brief.